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a matter of judgment, not logic. It is also fair to observe that, unlike the Court of Appeal, 
he was not bound by the decision in  The Glendarroch . 
 It has been said that in commercial law it is more important that the law is certain than 
that it is correct. The courts must provide the parties with a clear basis upon which to 
negotiate their contracts.  45  The Supreme Court reasoning in  Volcafe is both simpler and 
clearer than that in the Court of Appeal, and it provides certainty. 
 Paul Todd* 
 DEFINING EXCEPTIONS FOR INHERENT VICE 
 Volcafe v CSADV 
 The proceedings in  Volcafe Ltd v Compania Sud Americana De Vapores SA  1  were recently 
brought to a conclusion by a unanimous decision of the UK Supreme Court. This note 
focuses on the meaning and scope of exceptions for losses arising from “inherent vice”.  2  
Lord Sumption delivered the sole judgment, from which a number of insights can be 
drawn. Inherent vice exceptions are not “true” exceptions; they differ in scope depending 
on the contractual context in which they occur; but, generally, the scope of an exception 
for inherent vice is defi ned by “the nature of the service contracted for”.  3  
 Facts and the issue of inherent vice 
 The relevant facts can be summarised shortly. The claimants held bills of lading for 
consignments of bagged green coffee for carriage from Colombia to Bremen. The bills 
of lading were subject to English law and incorporated the Hague Rules: it was common 
ground that the defendant-carriers were responsible under the bill of lading contracts for 
preparing the containers for carriage and stowing the cargo therein. The cargo was shipped 
in unventilated containers, a common practice at the time. Coffee has a natural tendency to 
absorb, store and emit moisture: when carried in unventilated containers from a warm to 
a cooler climate, the beans “inevitably” emit moisture which may condense on the inside 
of the containers.  4  Accordingly, the defendant-carriers had lined the containers with Kraft 
paper. Despite this precaution, upon arrival at Bremen many bags of coffee had suffered 
water damage from condensation. 
 45.  Eg,  Federal Commerce and Navigation Co Ltd v Tradax Export SA (The Maratha Envoy)  [1977] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep 301 , 304; [1978] AC 1, 8 (observations of Lord Diplock). The Hague Rules were incorporated in  Volcafe by 
contract. Of course, where they or Hague-Visby apply compulsorily, there is less scope for negotiating a liability 
regime, but everything else remains negotiable. 
 * Professor of Commercial and Maritime Law, University of Southampton. 
 1.  [2018] UKSC 61;  [2019] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 21 ; [2018] 3 WLR 2087 (hereafter “ Volcafe ”) (Lords Reed, 
Wilson, Sumption, Hodge and Kitchin); reversing [2016] EWCA Civ 1103;  [2017] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 32 ; [2017] QB 
915 (“ Volcafe CA”); and restoring [2015] EWHC 516 (Comm);  [2015] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 639 . 
 2.  Other aspects of the Supreme Court’s judgment are noted  ante , 183. 
 3.  Volcafe , [35]. 

















190 LLOYD’S MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW QUARTERLY
© Informa UK plc. No unauthorised copying or sharing of this document is permitted
 In response to the cargo owners’ claims, the carriers argued, amongst other matters, 
that the damage had arisen from “inherent defect, quality or vice” of the cargo, which 
afforded them a defence under the Hague Rules, Art.IV(2)(m), because “the coffee beans 
were unable to withstand the ordinary levels of condensation forming in containers during 
passages from warm to cool climates”.  5  The claimants contended, in response, that the 
damage arose from the carriers’ negligent failure adequately to line the containers so as to 
protect the cargo from its own inherent characteristics. 
 Inherent vice exceptions are not “true” exceptions 
 The Court of Appeal’s approach to the inherent vice issue was driven by two premises. First, 
Flaux J held that the burden of proof under Art.IV(2)(m) shifted in two stages: initially, a 
carrier hoping to escape liability for cargo damage had to prove that it had been caused by 
inherent vice; then, cargo-claimants bore the burden of showing that the negligence of the 
carrier was causally relevant.  6  To require that the carrier disprove its own negligence was 
held to be impermissible, as being contrary to “the weight of the authorities”  7  beginning 
with  The Glendarroch .  8  Second, inherent vice was a long-recognised excepted peril,  9  
which needed to be defi ned in such a way that it could apply, in appropriate cases, even 
where a cargo of a “normal”, “extensively carried” type suffered damage whilst being 
carried properly and carefully in accordance with a “sound system”.  10  
 These starting premises led Flaux J to seek to identify a concept of inherent vice, 
analytically distinct from the question whether the carrier had been negligent, which 
the carrier could hope to establish at the fi rst stage of proof under Art.IV(2)(m).  11  He 
acknowledged the diffi culties: 
 “there is inevitably a degree of overlap, if not of circularity, given the defi nition of inherent vice, 
in the sense that one is focusing on the ability of the cargo to withstand the ordinary incidents of 
carriage, pursuant to obligations of the carrier under the contract of carriage, so that if the carrier has 
not complied with those obligations, the exception will not apply…”.  12  
 Nevertheless, Flaux J sought this distinct concept of inherent vice in cases interpreting 
the Marine Insurance Act 1906, s.55(2)(c),  13  as in his view inherent vice “should be treated 
similarly, in the context of both carriage by sea and marine insurance”.  14  Regrettably, those 
aspects of Donaldson LJ’s judgment in  Soya v White  15  upon which Flaux J relied in this regard 
 5.  Ibid , [4]. 
 6.  Volcafe CA, [50]. 
 7.  Ibid , [50]. 
 8.  [1894] P 226; discussed  Volcafe CA, [31–50]. 
 9.  Volcafe CA, [54]. 
 10.  Ibid , [56–57], [68–73]. 
 11.  Ibid , [53]. 
 12.  Ibid , [55]. 
 13.  “… the insurer is not liable for … inherent vice or nature of the subject-matter insured …” 
 14.  Ibid , [58]. Writing extrajudicially, Flaux LJ (as he had become) confi rmed that marine insurance reasoning 
was applied in  Volcafe CA: Flaux LJ, “Doomed from the start: Inevitability of loss in commercial law—inherent 
vice and external causes” (The Lords Goff and Hobhouse Memorial Lecture, 7KBW, London, 18 January 2018) 
 https://7kbw.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/The-Lords-Goff-and-Hobhouse-Lecture.pdf , paras 36, 50. 
 15.  Soya GmbH Mainz Kommanditgesellschaft v White  [1982] Lloyd’s Rep IR 136 (CA) (hereafter “ Soya CA”); 
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had been authoritatively disapproved in  The Cendor MOPU .  16  Moreover, from a second 
authority,  17  Flaux J could draw obtained only that inherent vice was conceptually different from 
inevitability of damage and could “include inherent qualities of an otherwise normal cargo”.  18  
 Ultimately, the position reached by the Court of Appeal was “that the carrier need only 
prove that the cargo had an inherent propensity to deteriorate, but not that he took reasonable 
care to prevent that propensity from manifesting itself”.  19  This was unacceptable to Lord 
Sumption. One reason for this, it would seem, was that it effectively meant that the carrier 
would not bear the burden of proving that any such inherent propensity was the proximate 
cause of the damage. This emerges from Lord Sumption’s general rejection of the approach 
to the burden of proof in  The Glendarroch : “if an exception is subject to an exception for 
cases where it was avoidable by the exercise of due care, then the issue must ultimately 
be one of causation … If … the burden of proving facts bringing the carrier within the 
exception lay on him, that must extend not just to the question whether the sea conditions 
were perilous, but also to the question whether that was the effective cause of the damage.”  20  
 (In Lord Esher MR’s defence, it might be observed that his approach to the burden 
of proof in  The Glendarroch seems naturally to complement that way of thinking about 
causation, acceptable at the time but now rejected, which emphasised isolating and 
labelling a series of discrete events in time—“distinct from one another as beads in a row 
or links in a chain”  21  —with the last in time being the “causa proxima”, etc.  22  ) 
 Lord Sumption’s second reason for rejecting the Court of Appeal’s position stemmed 
from his view that it was “impossible” to identify an analytically distinct concept of 
inherent vice: “A cargo does not suffer from inherent vice in the abstract, but only in 
relation to some assumed standard of knowledge and diligence on the part of the carrier.”  23  
Article IV(2)(m) applies only where the carrier establishes either that the damage to the 
cargo occurred despite its having taken reasonable care, or that taking reasonable steps to 
care for the cargo would have been ineffective “in the face of its inherent propensities”.  24  
Barring rare cases of inevitable deterioration, the existence of inherent vice depends on the 
carrier’s fulfi lling its obligation to exercise the appropriate standard of care.  25  
 In this way, Lord Sumption seems to have reached the same position as the judge at fi rst 
instance, who had observed that there was “complete circularity” between Art.IV(2)(m) and 
the carrier’s obligations under the Hague Rules, Art.III(2), such that inherent vice was “not 
in any real sense … an excepted peril” but was “no more than a category of case … in which 
 16.  Global Process Systems Inc v Syarikat Takaful Malaysia BhD (The Cendor MOPU) [2011] UKSC 5; 
 [2001] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 560 ; [2011] Bus LR 537 (hereafter “ The Cendor MOPU ”); see  infra , fn.38. 
 17.  Noten BV v Harding  [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 283 ; discussed  Volcafe CA, [58–63]. 
 18.  Volcafe CA, [58]. 
 19.  Volcafe , [39]. 
 20.  Ibid , [32]. 
 21.  Leyland Shipping Co Ltd v Norwich Union Fire Ins Soc Ltd [1918] AC 350, 369 (Lord Shaw of 
Dunfermline). 
 22.  See Lord Esher MR on this approach to causation in,  inter alia ,  The Xantho (1886) 11 PD 170, 172–173 
(reversed on other grounds (1887) 12 App Cas 503 (HL)), and  Hamilton Fraser & Co v Pandorf & Co (1886) 17 
QBD 670, 674–675 (reversed (1887) 12 App Cas 518 (HL)). See also Lord Sumner, dissenting, in  P Samuel and 
Co Ltd v Dumas [1924] AC 431 (HL), 467–474. 
 23.  Volcafe , [34]. 
 24.  Ibid , [37]. 
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breach of the [carriers’] obligations is necessarily negatived”.  26  Allowing for the different 
contractual contexts, this is strikingly similar to the position reached by the Supreme Court 
in  The Cendor MOPU , in matters of marine insurance, according to which s.55(2)(c) of the 
1906 Act constitutes a “limitation on cover” but not a “true exception”,  27  a “clarifi cation on 
the scope of cover” which “provides an example of a circumstance of a loss not proximately 
caused by a peril insured against”, but not a “contractual exclusion”.  28  
 Inherent vice exceptions differ in scope 
 Accordingly, while there  is thus a similarity in the treatment of inherent vice exceptions in 
the contexts of carriage by sea and marine insurance, it is not that which Flaux J envisaged. 
Further, Lord Sumption’s judgment in  Volcafe, and the earlier marine insurance case,  The 
Cendor MOPU , now reveals precisely how the inherent vice exceptions differ in scope as 
between those two species of contracts. In a contract of carriage, inherent vice will not 
exist where a breach of the carrier’s obligation to take care of the cargo is a proximate 
cause of the loss. As Lord Reid put it, there will be inherent vice only where “the goods 
could not stand the treatment which the contract authorised or required”.  29  In a contract of 
marine insurance, on the other hand, the standard of care to be observed by the carrier is 
irrelevant. Instead, where the loss is not inevitable,  30  the intervention of any insured peril 
as a proximate cause of the loss excludes inherent vice from consideration: the lack of 
fi tness of the subject matter for the insured voyage is irrelevant.  31  
 The notion that inherent vice must have a different meaning or scope in these two 
contexts is not new. Much the same distinction is to be found in the London marine 
insurance codes of the late-sixteenth century,  32  and in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
French commentaries cited by English lawyers and judges of their day as authorities on 
the law of merchants and maritime matters.  33  More recently, Professor Bennett made a 
series of cogent arguments in favour of this distinction,  34  and was critical of the Court of 
 26.  Cited  Volcafe CA, [15]. 
 27.  The Cendor MOPU , [88] (Lord Mance). 
 28.  Ibid , [143] (Lord Clarke), citing H Bennett, “Fortuity in the law of marine insurance”  [2007] LMCLQ 
315 . 
 29.  Albacora SRL v Westcott & Laurence Line Ltd  [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 53 , 59; 1966 SC(HL) 19, 23. 
 30.  In insurance, “inevitability” is said to be a separate defence, which partially overlaps with inherent vice: 
see eg  The  Cendor MOPU , [51] (Lord Mance). 
 31.  Ibid , [80–81] (Lord Mance), [103–112] (Lord Clarke). 
 32.  Guido Rossi,  Insurance in Elizabethan England: The London Code (CUP, 2016), 339–344, 590–591. 
 33.  eg Cleirac,  Us et Coustumes de la Mer (Bordeaux, 1647), ch.5, arts 8–9, 261–262, and ch.7, art.10, 
296–297; and in J-M Pardessus,  Collection de lois maritimes antérieures au XVIII e siècle , vol 2 (Paris, 1831), 
390 n 2, and 404 n 1. Insurers’ liability in such cases was subsidiary to the master’s, where the latter’s fault had 
contributed to the loss: Cleirac, ch.5, arts 4–6, 258–260; Pardessus, 388 n 5, 389 nn 3–4. See also R-J Valin, 
 Nouveau Commentaire sur l’Ordonnance de la Marine du mois d’Août 1681 (La Rochelle, 1760), vol 1, 599 
(book 3, title 2 (“des Connoissemens”), art.2); vol 2, 74–76 (book 3, title 6 (“des Assurances”), arts 28 and 
29); vol.2, 149–150, 152 (book 3, title 7 (“des Avaries”), arts 4 and 5). On citation of these in England see: CP 
Rogers, “Continental literature and the development of the common law by the King’s Bench: c 1750–1800”, in 
V Piergiovanni (ed),  The courts and the development of commercial law (Duncker & Humblot, 1987), 166–168; J 
Story, “Literature of the Maritime Law”, in WW Story (ed),  The Miscellaneous Writings of Joseph Story (Boston, 
1852), 112–115. An example of English counsel citing Cleirac in the seventeenth century:  Mors v Slew (1673) 3 
Keble 112, 114; 84 ER 624, 625. 
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Appeal in  Soya v White ,  35  and of Moore-Bick J in  Mayban General Insurance v Alstom 
Power Plants ,  36  for importing the carriage-contract notion of inherent vice into the marine 
insurance context.  37  In  The Cendor MOPU the UK Supreme Court adopted Professor 
Bennett’s position.  38  
 Despite this, the Court of Appeal in  Volcafe reasserted that inherent vice exceptions 
should be of similar scope in the carriage-contract and marine insurance contexts. Leaving 
aside the burden-of-proof issues which infl uenced Flaux J in the present matter, it is 
interesting to speculate as to what factors might have prompted the courts from time 
to time to make this error. One factor might be a tendency, evoked by Lord Sumption, 
to refer “by way of background” to the position of common carriers, who typically are 
compared to insurers because, with limited exceptions, they are strictly liable for loss of 
or damage to the cargo.  39  Lord Sumption condemned this, noting that common carriership 
was “no longer a useful paradigm”, being “an almost extinct category”  40  and a “somewhat 
theoretical case”.  41  The more appropriate starting point was the position of bailees of 
goods for reward,  42  who are not liable as insurers.  43  
 Another (obvious) factor is that the same term—“inherent vice” or something similar— 
is used in both contexts. This terminological similarity refl ects a shared conceptual root, 
as in both contexts, “inherent vice” refers to a cause of damage involving some internal 
vulnerability of the subject matter. And in both contexts an inherent vice exception delineates 
a range of risks pertaining to the subject matter of the contract which the counterparty—
carrier or insurer—is unwilling to assume. Indeed, as Professor Bennett highlighted, there are 
terms employed in both the carriage and the marine insurance contexts that share a common 
meaning, like “perils of the sea”.  44  Yet other concepts, like “seaworthiness” bear different 
meanings in these two contexts.  45  “Inherent vice”, as we have seen, is of the latter sort. 
 Inherent vice exceptions and “the nature of the service contracted for” 
 Lord Sumption’s judgment in  Volcafe , it is submitted, describes a coherent approach to 
determining the scope of exceptions for inherent vice in commercial contracts, generally: 
“the standard of care by reference to which the exception for inherent vice is to be assessed 
may depend on the nature of the service contracted for”.  46  
 35.  Soya CA, 149 col.2. 
 36.  [2004] EWHC 1038 (Comm);  [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 609 , [22]. 
 37.  Bennett  [2007] LMCLQ 315 , 346–348. 
 38.  The Cendor MOPU , [123–133], [138] (Lord Clarke). Writing extrajudicially, Flaux LJ later acknowledged 
that Professor Bennett’s criticisms had been vindicated in  The Cendor MOPU :  supra , fn.14, [26–27]. 
 39.  Volcafe , [8]. 
 40.  Ibid , [8]. 
 41.  Ibid , [17]. 
 42.  Ibid , [19]. 
 43.  Ibid , [8]. The distinction between the strictly liable “professional (or common)” carriers, and other 
“specially retained” (“non-professional”) carriers, was introduced into English law by Holt CJ in  Coggs v 
Barnard (1703) 2 Ld Raym 909; 92 ER 107: D Ibbetson, “ Coggs v Barnard ”, in C Mitchell and P Mitchell, 
 Landmark Cases in the Law of Contract (Hart, Oxford, 2008), 1, 17–18. 
 44.  Bennett  [2007] LMCLQ 315 , 342. See also  Pickering v Barkley (1648) 2 Rolle Abr 248, n 10. 
 45.  Bennett  [2007] LMCLQ 315 , 342. 
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 Professor Bennett can be seen to have made an earlier attempt at providing such an 
approach, in suggesting that inherent vice exceptions should differ in scope depending 
on the differing “commercial contexts” of contracts. Thus, he argued that it would be 
commercially reasonable for carriers to expect cargos to be capable of withstanding “the 
reasonably foreseeable perils of the voyage”, whereas underwriters might only reasonably 
expect their insured cargos to be able to withstand “peril[s] … such that it would be 
unusual for [them] not to be encountered”.  47  
 In  Volcafe and  The Cendor MOPU , it would seem that the principal consideration 
determining the scope of an inherent vice exception will normally be the nature of the 
obligations undertaken by the party providing the service. This should be identifi ed by 
construing the contract: the commercial context as such will be indirectly relevant, as 
background to the construction exercise. The differences in the services undertaken—to 
carry carefully and properly, on the one hand; to guarantee the subject matter from injury 
proximately caused by insured perils, on the other—explain the differences in the scope of 
the inherent vice exceptions in the carriage and marine insurance contexts. 
 Another aspect of this general approach relates to proximate cause. Whether a particular 
occurrence or condition is retained as a proximate cause has been variously described as 
a matter of common sense, fairness, or justice.  48  In the context of commercial contracts, 
“[t]he justice of the matter is to be found in the bargain struck by the parties”.  49  Accordingly, 
as has been decided in relation to contracts of carriage and of marine insurance, it seems 
likely that, where a breach of the service provider’s obligations under a commercial 
contract has intervened in a loss, it will generally be retained as the proximate cause and 
any inherent predisposition of the subject matter to deteriorate will be treated as a mere 
background condition. 
 Can this approach be generalised further? It is submitted that it already has been, in 
relation to other contracts and exceptions. Consider, for example, that the seller of goods, 
like the cargo owner under a contract of carriage, assumes an obligation to provide goods 
which are fi t for the purpose of their contract. The buyer, like the carrier, assumes the risks 
of loss or damage to the goods which arise from misuse. And, where there is misuse of 
a kind which a prudent supplier would not have contemplated, even if this has combined 
with a defect in the goods to cause a loss, it seems that the defect will not be retained as a 
proximate cause.  50  
 Jeffrey Thomson* 
 47.  Bennett  [2007] LMCLQ 315 , 342–343; also at 328, defi ning “habitual risks” of the insured adventure. 
His suggested scope for the inherent vice exception in the insurance context was rejected in  The Cendor MOPU : 
[79–81] (Lord Mance), [104] (Lord Clarke). 
 48.  Noten BV v Harding  [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 283 , 286–287;  Spencer v Wincanton Holdings Ltd [2009] 
EWCA Civ 1404; [2010] PIQR P8, [14–15];  Hughes-Holland v BPE Solicitors [2017] UKSC 21; [2018] AC 
599, [20–21]. 
 49.  Cosco Bulk Carrier Co Ltd v Team-Up Owning Co Ltd (The Saldanha) [2010] EWHC 1340 (Comm); 
 [2011] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 187 , [8] (Gross J). 
 50.  Decca Radar Ltd v Caserite Ltd  [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 301 . 
 * Lecturer in Law, The City Law School, City, University of London. 
